threat-model✓ تایید شده

محتوای SKILL.md

---
name: threat-model
description: STRIDE threat modeling before implementing security-sensitive features
triggers: [threat, STRIDE, attack surface, security design, new API, new feature security, threat model]
context_cost: medium
---

# Threat Model Skill

## Goal
Create a STRIDE threat model BEFORE implementing any security-sensitive feature. Prevents security issues at design time (cheapest point to fix) rather than after implementation (expensive) or in production (catastrophic).

## When to Invoke
- Before implementing: authentication, authorization, user registration, file upload
- Before implementing: payment processing, data storage, API endpoints, admin features
- Before any feature that handles: PII, financial data, health data, secrets, files

## Steps

1. **Identify system components and trust boundaries**
   - Reference the C4 Component diagram if it exists (`docs/architecture/`)
   - Draw the data flow: user → entry point → processing → storage → response
   - Mark trust boundaries (where permissions or privilege changes)
   - Identify actors: authenticated user, anonymous user, admin, external service, attacker

2. **Apply STRIDE to each component**

   For each component (API endpoint, service, data store), systematically ask:

   **S — Spoofing (impersonation)**
   - Can an attacker pretend to be another user or service?
   - Example threats: stolen JWT tokens, forged API keys, session hijacking

   **T — Tampering (data modification)**
   - Can an attacker modify data in transit or at rest?
   - Example threats: MITM attacks, SQL injection, parameter tampering, mass assignment

   **R — Repudiation (deny actions)**
   - Can an attacker deny performing an action?
   - Example threats: no audit log, no digital signature for financial transactions

   **I — Information Disclosure (data leaks)**
   - Can an attacker access data they shouldn't see?
   - Example threats: IDOR, verbose error messages, log injection, SSRF

   **D — Denial of Service**
   - Can an attacker degrade or block service availability?
   - Example threats: no rate limiting, resource exhaustion, large file uploads

   **E — Elevation of Privilege**
   - Can an attacker gain more permissions than they should have?
   - Example threats: JWT algorithm confusion, IDOR to admin endpoints, business logic bypass

3. **Score each threat**

   | Factor | Low | Medium | High |
   |---|---|---|---|
   | **Likelihood** | Attacker needs special access/skills | Known exploit pattern exists | Trivial to exploit |
   | **Impact** | Minor data exposure | User data compromised | All data, system compromise |

   Priority = Likelihood × Impact (High×High = Critical)

4. **Propose mitigations for High and Critical threats**

   ```markdown
   | Threat | STRIDE | L | I | Priority | Mitigation |
   |---|---|---|---|---|---|
   | Stolen JWT allows impersonation | S | H | H | Critical | Short expiry (15min), refresh token rotation, token revocation list |
   | IDOR on /users/{id} endpoint | I | M | H | High | Verify ownership: user.id === session.userId before returning |
   | No rate limit on /auth/login | D | H | M | High | Max 5 attempts/min per IP, 3 per account, exponential backoff |
   ```

5. **Fill THREAT_MODEL_TEMPLATE.md**
   - Save to: `docs/security/threat-models/[feature-name]-threat-model.md`

6. **Update CONSTITUTION.md** if new security invariants emerge
   - Example: "WHEN a user accesses /api/users/{id}, THE SYSTEM SHALL verify the requesting user owns that resource"

7. **Create tasks for mitigations**
   - Add each High/Critical mitigation to project/tasks.md
   - These are blocking tasks — must be implemented before the feature is complete

8. **Human review required**
   - Present threat model to human before implementing the feature
   - Confirm all Critical and High mitigations will be implemented

## STRIDE Quick Reference

| Letter | Category | Question to ask |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing | Who is claiming to be who, and how do we verify it? |
| T | Tampering | What data can be modified by unauthorized parties? |
| R | Repudiation | Can actions be denied? Are they logged immutably? |
| I | Information Disclosure | What can be leaked, and to whom? |
| D | Denial of Service | What can be exhausted, flooded, or blocked? |
| E | Elevation of Privilege | How can someone gain more access than intended? |

## Constraints
- Threat modeling is MANDATORY before implementing: auth, payment, file storage, admin features
- All Critical threats must have implemented mitigations before feature ships
- High threats must have mitigations or documented risk acceptance by human
- Never implement a security control without documenting why it addresses a specific threat

## Output Format
Completed threat model file at `docs/security/threat-models/[name]-threat-model.md` + tasks added for mitigations.

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